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ILL EFFECTS OF A WELL-INTENTIONED LAW:
THE RIGHTS OF THE HANDICAPPED OVERLOOKED
Robert Burgdorf, Jr.,*
Indiana's Public Law No. 162, which was signed
into law in 1972, is an admirable achievement. The
statute consolidated and clarified the procedures to
be employed by schools in suspending, expelling or
excluding students. The rights of students were closely
guarded through the clear enumeration of the require-
ments of due process in this area. Written notice, a
relatively formal hearing, the right to be represented
by counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses, a
written decision and record of the proceedings, and an
appeal procedure are all specifically mandated by the
law whenever a child may be suspended, expelled or
excluded. The aim of the law was both to protect
pupils from arbitrary decisions and, at the same time,
give school administrators a definite means by which
to dismiss pupils when it legitimately becomes necessary
to do so.
In electing to explicitly set down the reasons for
which a child may be barred from the public education
system and in setting up procedural safeguards to
insure that children's rights are protected, Indiana
has shown great awareness of current trends in
*Third year law student, Notre Dame Law School; Legal
Intern for the National Center for Law and the
Handicapped, South Bend, Indiana.
constitutional law and has proven itself to be in the
vanguard of the states in the movement towards delinea-
tion of educational rights. Unfortunately, however,
this well-intentioned statute is not an unequivocal
good; through legislative oversight and some poor
draftsmanship, it has been worded in such a way that
it could have undesirable effects upon the rights of
handicapped children.
Apparently, Act No. 162 was largely aimed at
dealing with disciplinary difficulties. The inclusion
of provisions relating to the "mentally or physically
unfit for school purposes" (Sec. 6(c)) was only in-
cidental, and little thought was given to the
possible ramifications of these provisions. No
malevolence was intended towards handicapped children,
but here, as in many other situations, their rights
were simply overlooked.
Indiana Law Prior to P. L. 162
To fully understand the effects and flaws of Public
Law No. 162, it is necessary to be aware of the state
of the law regarding education of the handicapped in
Indiana prior to 1972. Indiana's basic policy towards
education is set forth in the state Constitutional
provision that the public education system shall be
"equally open to all." (Ind. Constitution, Article 8,
1
Section 1) However, under the School Exclusion Bill
(Chapter 215 of the Acts of 1963)2 school superinten-
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dents had the power to exclude mentally and physically
handicapped children from the public schools:
The school superintendent of any
attendance district may, with the
approval of and under limitations
and regulations concerning the
procedures and requirements for
complete evaluation of children,
to be established by the state
board of education, exclude or
excuse from school any child
found mentally or physically
unfit for school attendance,
provided such approval shall
be valid for no longer than
the school yeas during which
it was issued.
The section did not state what obligations the state
does or does not have to provide an alternate means of
education to those children who are excluded. In other
words, it was unclear whether "exclusion" meant simply
exclusion from the regular public schools or whether it
meant total exclusion from any form or program of a
publicly-supported education. The rules and regula-
tions adopted by the State Board of Education pursuant
to the School Exclusion Bill provide that "an alternate
plan for the child" must be submitted4 , but it was not
mandated that this plan had to be other than referral
to a private agency or facility.
In application, many handicapped children, partic-
ularly those who were severely and profoundly mentally
retarded, were not provided with any alternative
publicly-supported educational program upon their
exclusion from the regular schools. Although the State
Board of Education Rules and Regulations provide for
special education classes, homebound instructions,
occupational therapy, physical therapy, experimental
programs and other special programs, these projects
were viewed as permissive undertakings by the local
school corporations; there was felt to be no duty to
provide an education for handicapped children.
The conclusion that the public school system can
totally wash its hands of any obligation to educate
the mentally and physically handicapped is of very
doubtful legal validity. Not only does it violate
Indiana's constitutional declaration that the public
schools shall be "equally open to all" but it would
also seem contrary to Article 1, Section 23 of the
Indiana Constitution. That section states:
The General Assembly shall not grant
to any citizen, or class of citizens,
privileges or immunities which, upon
the same terms, shall not equally
belong to all citizens.
Moreover, the practice of totally excluding a
child from the public education system because he is
handicapped is a violation of the Federal Constitu-
tional guarantee of "equal protection." Such is the
5
explicit holding of several recent federal court cases.
A state cannot provide a free public education for
normal children without providing the same service for
all handicapped children. However, in spite of the
legal deficiencies of such a policy, the practical
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reality is that public school administrators have
totally locked many handicapped children out of the
public education system. To date, this practice has
not been challenged in the courts; judicial tribunals
have not yet been given an opportunity to assure that
Indiana's schools will be "equally open to all."
In 1969, the Indiana General Assembly moved to
assure that the benefit of an education would be
accorded to all of the state's children, and in
particular to those individuals who had been excluded
from the regular schools because of a mental or
physical handicap. Chapter 396 of the Acts of 19696
makes the education of handicapped children mandatory.
After July 1, 1973, all handicapped children are
entitled to a free public school education which
meets their special needs.
Thus, the situation immediately prior to the
enactment of Act No. 162 was this: while there was a
legislative promise of a totally inclusive educational
system for the future, school administrators continued
(probably illegally and unconstitutionally) to reject
certain children because of their mental or physical
handicaps.
Problems Created by P. L. 162
Against the backdrop of previous legislation, it
is well to examine the problems cause by Act No. 162
due to the flaws of the Act as it relates to the rights
of the handicapped. Hopefully, by examining these
shortcomings in detail, such mistakes can be avoided
in future enactments. It is the particular area of
legislative draftsmanship that the oversights have
been made.
1. The first difficulty encountered in No. 162 occurs
in "Definitions", Sec. l(g):
"Expulsion" shall mean disciplinary
action whereby a student is (i) sus-
pended from school attendance for a
period in excess of five (5) days,
(ii) is suspended for the balance of
a then current semester or current
year, or (iii) is given other disci-
plinary action which automatically
prevents his completing within the
normal time his over-all course of
study in any school in the school
corporation. "Suspension" shall
mean any disciplinary action whereby
a student is suspended from school
attendance for a lesser period than
set forth in (i) and (ii) above.
"Exclusion" shall mean an exclusion
of a student from school attendance
for a longer period than thus set forth.
a. "Expulsion" and "suspension" are both defined
in terms of the word "suspended". Unless "suspended"
and "suspension" are unrelated words, there is clearly
a circular quality to these definitions.
b. "Exclusion" defined as "an exclusion" is
undoubtedly circular. Moreover, the phrase "for a
longer period than thus set forth" evidently refers
back to Sections (i) and (ii) of the "Expulsion"
definition. Therefore, the apparent meaning of the
phrase is "for a longer period than: (i) a period in
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excess of five days, and (ii) the balance of the then
current semester or current year." "A period in excess
of five days" is of indefinite duration, so "exclusion"
cannot be defined by saying that it is for a period
longer than such indefinite period. The second
possibility is that "exclusion" refers to a period
longer than the balance of the current semester or
current year. Section 12(f), however, provides that
"No expulsion or exclusion of a student shall be for
a longer period than the remainder of the school year,
in which it took effect." If expulsion may be for the
balance of the current year, the exclusion means a
period longer than expulsion, and yet exclusion cannot
be for longer than the balance of the current year,
then just what does "exclusion" mean? A period of
time both longer and shorter than the current year?
c. An additional problem with the definition of
"exclusion" is that it is unclear whether or not
"exclusion" is "disciplinary action". The phrase
"disciplinary action" is incorporated in the definition
of both "suspension" and "expulsion". Its absence in
the definition of "exclusion" leads to some ambiguity.
If "exclusion" was intended to be a type of "disciplin-
ary action", then those words should have been used in
its definition. Moreover, if "exclusion" is a type of
"disciplinary action", then the only difference between
the definitions of "expulsion" and "exclusion" is in
61
duration of time, a situation which clearly exacerbates
the time problems noted above. If, on the other hand,
"exclusion" is not meant to be encompassed by the
phrase "disciplinary action", the language such as
"action other than disciplinary action" would have made
the meaning much more clear. Additionally, if
"exclusion" means non-discuplinary action which is
"for a longer period than thus set forth", another
problem arises. What about non-disciplinary action
which is for a shorter period "than thus set forth"?
How do we classify that? It cannot be an expulsion
or suspension, for they encompass only "disciplinary
action". It cannot be an "exclusion", for its duration
is too short.
2. The last part of Section 1 Definitions (g) provides:
Where a student is assigned a special
course of study, is enrolled in special
classes or is given home-bound instruc-
tion, as permitted or provided by appli-
cable law, he shall not be deemed to
have been suspended or excluded from
school attendance within the meaning
of these definitions.
Section 6 provides:
Any student may be excluded from
school in the following curcum-
stances, subject to the procedural
provisions of this chapter: ... c)
Where any student is mentally or
physically unfit for school purposes..."
The combination of these two sections is potentially
devastating to the rights of the handicapped. Until
Section l(g) was enacted, Indiana law had never
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stated that "exclusion" did not mean simply exclusion
from regular classes. Since the exclusion contemplated
in this Act means total exclusion from any form of
publicly-supported instructional program, No. 162
strikes a grave blow to the fair treatment of handi-
capped children, and is of doubtful constitutional
validity. As already noted, there is a very serious
question whether handicapped children may be totally
locked out of the public school system consistent with
the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. If the state of the law regarding what
should be done with "excluded" handicapped children
was unclear prior to Act No. 162, it is now clearly
bad.
Complete exclusion is also directly contrary to
the intention of the Mandatory Special Education Act
7
which aimed to provide a public education for every
handicapped child, whether through regular classroom
instruction, special classes, or through home-bound
instruction. By providing for complete deprivation of
any form of public education to those "mentally or
physically unfit," Act No. 162 obviously undermines
the expressed legislative intent of total inclusion.
3. A. Section 9 provides that certain procedures,
including written notice and a formal hearing, must be
followed before a student is expelled or excluded.
The word "student" is nowhere defined. The remainder
63
of Article I, which was in effect prior to Act No. 162,
employs the word "pupil", but "pupil" is likewise un-
defined. Although at first blush the meanings of
these words appear fairly clear, ambiguity as to their
exact scope has resulted in serious problems. Princi-
pals and school boards have ruled that "student" shall
mean only those children who are actually enrolled in
the schools. When a parent brings his child to the
principal of a school and seeks admission, the princi-
pal may summarily rule to exclude him. If the parent
claims that he is entitled to the procedures set out
in P. L. 162, the principal is able to reply that the
child has not yet been enrolled, so he is not a
"student", and, therefore, he is not within the cover-
age of 162. The intent of 162, to provide a hearing
before children are excluded, can thus be evaded
entirely.
b. Another related set of problems concerns the
question of a student's age. P. L. 162 sets out no
age parameters for "student" and therefore gives no
guidance as to the scope of coverage of the 162 pro-
cedural framework. Five year-old children are
eligible for kindergarten; three year-olds are eligible
for some special education programs; special experi-
mental programs may be afforded to deaf children as
young as six months of age; at seven, children are
required by law to attend school -- but at what point
64
does the term "student" begin to apply? There are
similar problems at the other end; the ages of sixteen,
eighteen, and twenty-one are all of significance re-
garding the termination of educational programs, and
adult education has no upper age ceiling.
Does a child of five who is excluded from
kindergarten have the right to a hearing under Act No.
162? How about a one year-old deaf child who is expelle
from an experimental program, or is simply not accepted
into such a program. If a forty or fifty year-old
person is expelled or excluded from an adult education
class, does he have the right to invoke the 162 hearing
mechanism? Such questions presently remain unanswered,
but they could have been easily resolved in P. L. 162
by a clear delineation of who constitutes a "student"
covered by the Act. Lack of clarity is especially
serious in this area, because experience shows that
many administrators tend to use these vagaries to the
disadvantage of handicapped persons, i.e. to exclude
them without any 162 hearing. It seems that a proper
treatment of this matter would be to correlate the
age parameters for the availability of a hearing under
162 with the age of a person's eligibility in a par-
ticular program. Thus, whenever a person is eligible
for an educational program, he would have 162 pro-
cedures available to safeguard his rights.
4. Section 6 provides:
Any student may be excluded from school
in the following circumstances, subject
to the procedural provisions of this
chapter... c) Where any student is
mentally or physically unfit for school
purposes, subject, however, to the
procedures set up under the provisions
of I.C. 1971, 20-8-8-5, and to the
limitations and regulations authorized
to be established thereunder by the
state board of education.
The "subject to" language in Subsection C has
caused some problems. The probable intent of the
Section was that the procedures described in 20-8-8-5
should be used in addition to the 162 procedures; the
formal hearing required in 162 would thus serve as an
additional safeguard to see that a child's rights were
not being denied under the older process. However,
some school boards have ruled that "subject to" means
that the 20-8-8-5 procedures are a substitute for 162
procedures. Thus, if the older process, which simply
calls for a complete mental, physical, social and
emotional evaluation of the child, has been followed,
the board may feel that the child is not entitled to
any 162 hearing. Once again, we see that the
language of the Act can be used to circumvent its
purpose.
5. The definition of "exclusion" in terms of "an
exclusion" has already been mentioned. The failure to
spell out in any detail what type of action constitutes
exclusion has been the source of a serious practical
problem. Some principals, instead of stating that a
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handicapped child is "excluded", simply place him on a
waiting list. The parents are told that if a vacancy
arises, then their child will be admitted. The child
is provided no training or instruction during the
interim. The waiting period may continue through the
current school year and thereafter for an indefinite
period. In effect, the child is deprived of his
rightful education, but because such action is not
declared to be within the meaning of "exclusion", he
is probably not accorded the procedural safeguards
set out in Act No. 162.
6. Another defect in No. 162 is that it fails to state
who has the burden of proof. Does the school system
have to show that the student ought to be suspended,
excluded, or expelled, or does the student have to
show that he should be included? If no evidence or
insufficient evidence is presented, who wins? The
answers to these questions may be determinative in
many cases.
Constitutionally, the burden ought to be placed
upon the school system to prove that there are
sufficient reasons for the suspension, exclusion or
expulsion. See e.g. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education, 294 F.2d 150 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1961). This
principle has been specifically applied to handicapped
children in Mills v. Board of Education of the District
of Columbia, Civil Action No. 1939-71 (Dist. Ct. D. C.,
Aug.l, 1972), where the court stated that the school
officials were to "bear the burden of proof as to all
facts and as to the appropriateness of any placement,
denial of placement or transfer." The same allocation
of evidentiary burden should have been delineated in
P. L. 162.
7. The Mills case, supra., underlines another flaw in
No. 162. In Mills, the due process hearing procedures
were accorded whenever there was a placement in special
classes, a denial of such placement, or a transfer, and
the parent or guardian registered an objection. The
procedures set up under No. 162 apply only to
suspensions, expulsions and exclusions. A child's
welfare can be seriously impaired by his placement into
an inappropriate program. The chances of misplacement
are increased when, as is frequently the case, placement
evaluations are based upon a single test of the child's
abilities. A number of courts have had occasion to
deal with the problems involved in labeling and "track
systems" in education. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401 (Dist. Ct. D. C., 1967). It is
apparent that a child's placement is a very serious
matter; he ought to be afforded the procedural devices
by which to challenge an improper placement.
8. Section 10 provides:
The hearing examiner shall be any
person on the school corporation's
administrative staff, or its counsel,
provided he (i) has not brought the
charges against the student, (ii)
will not be a witness at the hearing,
and (iii) has no involvement in the
charge.
Presumably, the basic goal of Act No. 162 was to create
procedures which comply with the requirements of due
process. Due process procedures normally assume that
the person or group presiding over a hearing will be an
independent entity and not an arm of one side or the
other. Although provisos (i), (ii) and (iii) serve to
prevent some blatant prejudices on the part of the
hearing examiner, as a member of the school corpora-
tion's staff or as its counsel he can hardly be
thought of as independent. The close interrelation-
ship and cooperation between employees of the school
system and the frequently bureaucratic organizational
structure dictate that the hearing examiner will oftenI
be far from impartial. He has to judge between his
friends, fellow employees and his bosses, on the one
hand, and, on the other, a child and parents who will
frequently be unknown to him.
It is doubtful whether a hearing by such a biased
person can go any distance toward complying with the
requirements of due process. In effect, such a pro-
cedure is little more than a reexamination and re-
affirmation by the school system of one of its own
decisions. This is hardly an adequate forum for the
protection of rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. The Mills case, supra., requires that
the hearing officer shall be "independent". He is to
be paid for his services by the school system, "but
shall not be an officer, employee or agent of the
Public School System." If Act No. 162 is to have any
effect insofar as compliance with the Due Process Clause
is concerned, a similar mandate of independence should
have been made.
9. The problems already discussed concerning the non-
independence of hearing officers and the absence of a
clear allocation of the burden of proof are magnified
by the type of judicial review permissible under the
Act. Section 12(d) describes the method of appeal
which can be taken in a state court from the final
action of a school board:
Such appeal shall be initiated by the
filing of a complaint which shall be
sufficient if it alleges in general
terms that the governing body acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, without
substantial evidence, unreasonably
or unlawfully. The trial of the
appeal, except as provided herein,
shall be tried in the same manner
as other civil cases. The defendant
shall be the school corporation. ."
Since the school corporation is the defendant and the
child and parents or guardian are the plaintiffs, and
the case is to be tried "in the same manner as other
civil cases," the duty is upon the child and his
representatives to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the allegations in the complaint are
true. This situation has two notable results: 1) The
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burden of proof is upon the child and parents instead
of upon the school system as would seem to be con-
stitutionally required. See Problem 6, supra. 2) The
allegation which must be proved is not that the deci-
sion of the school board is wrong, but that it acted
"arbitrarily, capriciously, without substantial
evidence, unreasonably or wrongfully"; according to
No. 162 the court cannot reverse the school system's
decision simply because it disagrees with the decision.
These effects would probably be defended on the
ground that the court's function in this case is
simply to review an administrative decision. In such
a situation, the argument would run, the decision
should be presumed valid, and only reversed where it
can be shown that the administrative hearing body has
abused its discretion. In fact, the terms, "arbitrar-
ily, capriciously, without substantial evidence," etc.
are the customary formulations used to describe the
standards upon which courts may review the decisions
of administrative agencies.
The analogy of decisions made under No. 162 and
decisions of administrative agencies, however, does
not stand up upon close examination. Administrative
agencies are presumed to be independent bodies; as
already noted, 162 hearing examiners are far from
independent. Where there has been a fair adversary
proceeding conducted before an impartial tribunal,
there is sufficient rationale for a presumption that
the tribunal's decision is correct and should be
subjected to only limited judicial review; such is
manifestly not the case regarding hearings conducted
under No. 162.
Moreover, courts are generally hesitant to meddle
with administrative decisions because of the highly
complex nature of the subject matter, e.g. atomic
energy, interstate commerce, aviation, communication,
etc., and because of the special expertise of the
agencies involved. The decisions regarding suspension,
expulsion, or exclusion are not so complex that they
are not capable of resolution by the courts. In
addition, if, as already noted, the burden of proof as
to the necessity of suspension, expulsion, or exclusion
should properly be upon the school corporation, a fair
opportunity to be heard has not been accorded unless
the burden is so laid. If, as in the No. 162 hearing
procedure, the courts ought not presume that the
decision is valid; quite the contrary, the decision
should be presumptively invalid.
In short, the mere review by a member of the
school system of a decision made by another member or
group of members ought not suffice to: 1) shift the
burden of proof from the school corporation to the
child and his representatives, and 2) create a pre-
sumption that the decision is correct and can only be
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set aside by proof of "abuse of discretion". In order
to assure that children are not deprived of the protec-
tions of due process of law, court review of decisions
made under P. L. 162 ought to be a trial de novo and
the burden of proof should be placed upon the school
system. The record of the hearing should merely serve
as evidence at the trial.
Disproportionate Effect
It should be noted that while many of these flaws
of No. 162 relate specifically to the handicapped, some
of the shortcomings of the Act are general in nature --
their application is not limited to handicapped
persons. Practically, however, a handicapped child is
much more likely to be the subject of an exclusion than
is a normal child. Handicapped children are often
viewed as undesirable or, at least, less desirable as
students. Often more difficulty is involved and more
teachers are required to teach handicapped pupils than
to teach those without handicaps. For these reasons,
many school officials have shown much less reluctance
to exclude a handicapped child than to exclude a normal
child. Thus, any gaps in the procedural protections
constructed by Public Law 162 fall more heavily upon
the handicapped than upon other children. Having the
greatest likelihood of being wronged, handicapped
children need protective mechanisms most and are most
seriously harmed by defects in these safeguards.
Solutions
It is not difficult to find solutions for the
problems outlined here which result from the wording
of Act No. 162. In many instances, the mere statement
of the problem suggests the manner in which it could
have been avoided. Slight changes in drafting may
reap great benefits in the workability and effective-
ness of the statutory scheme presented in 162. The
specific corrections to be proposed here will be
numbered in the same manner as the problems have been
numbered above, so that the pumbered solutions will
correspond to the problems which they are designed to
solve.
1. The definitions of "exclusion", "suspension",
and "expulsion" should be reworked so that the dis-
tinctions between them are clearly spelled out.
a. "Expulsion" and "suspension" should be
defined in terms of a word other than "suspended".
"Barred", "dismissed", "prohibited", "stopped", or
some such word should be used instead.
b. and c. "Exclusion" should be completely re-
defined so as to remove ambiguity. A formulation
such as the following might be used:
"Exclusion" shall mean non-disciplinary
action whereby a student is barred from
school attendance.
Such wording avoids confusion as to time distinctions
between exclusion, expulsion and suspension. Any non-
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disciplinary action, no matter what its duration,
which results in a child being barred from school
attendance constitutes an exclusion.
2. To avoid Act No. 162 having an incidental effect
of sanctioning total exclusion of handicapped children
when such an effect is contrary to the federal consti-
tution, the Indiana constitution, and the intent of the
Indiana legislature as expressed in the Mandatory
Special Education Act 8 , two possibilities present them-
selves. The first would be to declare that "exclusion"
only means exclusion from regular classes. Therefore,
the decision to grant an exclusion would not relieve
the state of its obligation to provide the child with
an alternative educational program, e.g. special
education classes, home-bound instruction, etc. The
second alternative is to delete mental and physical
unfitness from the grounds for exclusion under Section
6. This solution is probably more in line with the
natural connotations of the word "exclusion", and would
leave the process of exclusion untouched regarding
other grounds for its operation.
3. "Student" should be defined by a formula such as
"any person who is enrolled in any educational program
of the school corporation or who, according to his age
and place of residence, is eligible for such a pro-
gram." Thus, if a person is of the proper age and
lives in the school district, he could not be expelled
or excluded without a hearing under No. 162.
4. Instead of 162 hearing procedures being "subject
to" evaluation procedures of Indiana Code 1971, 20-8-8-
5, the former safeguards should be "in addition to" the
latter.
5. It ought to be stated that "exclusion" includes
placement on a waiting list and any other nondisciplin-
ary action which bars a child from attending school.
6. The burden of proof as to the necessity for a
suspension, exclusion, or expulsion should be explicitly
placed upon the school system and school officials.
7. 162 procedures should apply not only to exclusions,
suspensions and expulsions, but also to any placement
in special classes, a denial of such placement, or a
transfer, to which the parent objects.
8. As in the Mills decision, it should be provided
that the "independent" hearing officer is to be paid
for his services by the school system, but that he is
not to be an officer, employee or agent of the school
system.
9. Appeal to the courts from a decision of the
school board should be a trial de novo with the record
of the hearing serving only as evidence. At this trial
the burden of proof should be on the school system to
justify its chosen action.
The Basic Mistake
Underlying each of the imperfections which we
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have noted in Public Law No. 162 is a more basic pro-
blem which is reflected in many other pieces of
legislation. There is in Act No. 162 no positive in-
tent to shortchange handicapped children; flaws in the
Act were certainly not the result of malice towards the
handicapped on the part of draftsmen or legislators.
The rights of handicapped persons were simply over-
looked. Too often the handicapped are an invisible
minority. Too often we forget, or would like to
forget, the serious and complex problems faced by
those whose bodies or minds are not quite the same as
ours.
If legislation is to benefit all citizens, special
attention must be paid to the difficulties encountered
by handicapped people. Statutes designed to assure
fair and equal treatment for all must not be permitted
to serve as vehicles for treating handicapped persons
unfairly and unequally.
An Answer: N.C.L.H.
In order to alert politicians, legislators and
the general public to the legal rights of handicapped
persons, a National Center for Law and the Handicapped
has been created. The Center, which is funded by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, officially
opened on September 1, 1972. In addition to HEW, the
creation of the Center was sponsored by four organiza-
tions: the Family Law Section of the American Bar
Association, the National Association for Retarded
Children, the Council for the Retarded of St. Joseph
County, and the University of Notre Dame.
The basic functions of NCLH as outlined by its
Board of Directors are three: to educate the public,
to assist in litigation, and to assist in the drafting
and enacting of legislation. The educative function
will include seminars and workshops for those con-
cerned with the rights of the handicapped, and acting
as a clearing house for information as to litigation,
legislation, and other matters affecting handicapped
people.
When education and informal persuasive efforts
fail to safeguard the rights of the handicapped, then
the second function of NCLH, assisting in litigation,
comes to the fore. Such assistance may run the full
gamut from gathering preliminary data and weighing the
advisability of bringing a court suit to the actual
arguing of cases and to keeping watch to see that a
court's judgment is actually being implemented.
Recent months have been a fruitful time as to
judicial decisions concerning the rights of handicapped
persons. Especially in the areas of the rights of
persons in institutions and the right of the handi-
capped to an equal education, important precedents
have been established. NCLH is working to assure that
these judicial breakthroughs will be applied nationwide.
Thirdly, NCLH is anxious to cooperate with
legislators, draftsmen and interested groups in the
drafting of legislation which accords fair treatment
to handicapped people. Regarding Senate Act No. 162
specifically, NCLH is in contact with draftsmen and
legislators, and has pointed out the flaws discussed
above; hopefully the errors will be removed through
corrective action by the legislature. If, on the other
hand, No. 162 is not corrected, and if it or any other
statute is used to discriminate against handicapped
people, NCLH may be forced to become involved in a
suit to protect the constitutional rights of the
handicapped. The constitutional infirmities involved
in Act No. 162's shortcomings have already been noted:
in light of recent decisions, it appears that federal
courts will not be hesitant to strike down parts of
the statute which are applied so as to treat the handi-
capped discriminatorily. Hopefully, in the future the
efforts of NCLH and other such groups will prevent
errors such as those in P. L. 162 from occurring at
all. Over the years, the governmental institutions in
the United States have been made aware of the riqhts
of racial minorities, women, and other previously un-
protected groups. It appears that the time has come
for recognition of the rights of handicapped persons.
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